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The EU’s Responses to Conﬂicts in its Wider
Neighbourhood: Human or European Security?
ARGYRO KARTSONAKI and STEFAN WOLFF
The conﬂicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, within and between the “neighbours’
neighbours”, have been on the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda for some time
and offer a useful set of cases to examine rival claims in the existing literature about the
extent to which the EU’s foreign and security policy is driven by human or European secur-
ity imperatives. In order to understand how and why the EU has responded to these con-
ﬂicts, we initially present an overview of all conﬂicts among and between the neighbours’
neighbours, broken down ﬁrst by sub-region and then by conﬂict type. We then discuss the
EU’s responses to these conﬂicts and offer a comparative analysis, with a view to describing
and explaining existing variation in terms of the EU’s responses and their impact. We ﬁnd
that the Union’s response is most in line with a human security approach in relation to
those conﬂicts where it perceives to have the greatest interests at stake.
Introduction
The EU and its predecessors have had their fair share of conﬂict-related security chal-
lenges to deal with over the past six decades. While there has been no violent conﬂict
between its member states, conﬂicts within member states have been, and continue
to be, sources of instability. Northern Ireland and the Basque country, Corsica and
South Tyrol are among the illustrative examples, with the case of Cyprus/Northern
Cyprus perhaps the one that demonstrates most vividly the limitations of the EU to
facilitate sustainable conﬂict settlements within its own boundaries. Moreover, such
issues are not conﬁned to the past as the heated debates over independence referenda
in Scotland and Catalonia vividly demonstrate.
Beyond the member states, violent conﬂicts in the Western Balkans throughout
the 1990s were high on the EU agenda then, and the Union remains heavily
engaged in managing that region’s various conﬂict-related problems.1 The
countries of the southern and eastern neighbourhood, too, have experienced sig-
niﬁcant levels of conﬂict that have posed a challenge to the EU as it pursues its
goal of a stable and secure neighbourhood.2 In the southern dimension of the
1. Annemarie Peen Rodt and Stefan Wolff, "European Union Conﬂict Management in the Western
Balkans", Civil Wars, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012), pp. 414–430.
2. Nathalie Tocci, The EU’s Role in Conﬂict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the European Neighbourhood
(London: Routledge, 2007).
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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), longstanding conﬂicts like those in the
Western Sahara and the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conﬂicts remain on the
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and ENP agendas, alongside
the more recent conﬂicts that emerged during and in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring in North Africa (especially in Libya and Egypt) and the protracted and
spreading Syrian civil war.3 In the eastern dimension, the so-called frozen conﬂicts
in the successor states of the Soviet Union (e.g., Moldova/Transnistria) and most
recently the crisis in Ukraine have also seen a good deal of EU involvement in
efforts to ﬁnd viable solutions.4
A signiﬁcant body of literature has emerged over the past two decades that
has engaged with the EU as a security actor, and for the past 10 years a more
speciﬁc sub-ﬁeld in this wider area has analysed the role of the EU as a conﬂict
manager. While a vast number of studies have considered a variety of aspects of
EU conﬂict management by focusing on individual cases or offering comparative
perspectives,5 no systematic analysis exists so far that considers the EU’s role as
a conﬂict manager in the geographical area of its wider neighbourhood.
This is somewhat surprising as conﬂicts within and between the “neighbours’
neighbours” have been on the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda
for some time, both in a direct sense of threats to be dealt with and in a
more indirect way because of their impact on the geographically closer
neighbourhood.
In addressing this gap, we adopt a comparative approach to the EU’s
responses to conﬂicts in its wider neighbourhood. Comparative research into
conﬂicts and their (external) management can approach its subject matter in a
variety of different ways. Cases can be selected, categorised and analysed in
relation to factors speciﬁc to the conﬂict (parties, intensity, duration, issue of
disagreement, etc.), its geographic location, the type of intervention (economic,
diplomatic, military, etc.) or the intervening actor/s (states, coalitions of states,
regional and international organisations, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), individuals). This choice is obviously dependent on the type of
question that research seeks to answer. In our case, we are interested in
3. Toby Dodge and Emile Hokayem (eds.), Middle Eastern Security, the US Pivot, and the Rise of Isis
(Adelphi Book 447) (London: IISS/Routledge, 2014).
4. AmandaAkçakoca et al.,After Georgia: Conﬂict Resolution in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (Brussels:
European Policy Centre, 2009); Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, "The EU as a Conﬂict Manager?
The Case of Georgia and Its Implications", International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2010), pp. 87–107.
5. For example, Fraser Cameron, The EU and International Organisations: Partners in Crisis Management
(Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005); Bruno Charbonneau, "What Is So Special about the European
Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 4
(2009), pp. 546–561; Laure Delcour, "The European Union, a Security Provider in the Eastern Neighbour-
hood?", European Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2010), pp. 535–549; Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias
Albert, "The European Union and Border Conﬂicts: The Transformative Power of Integration", Inter-
national Organization, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2006), pp. 563–593; Bastian Giegerich, "EU Crisis Management:
Ambitions and Achievements", The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 48, No. 397 (2008), pp. 15–34; Gorm Rye
Olsen, "The EU and Conﬂict Management in African Emergencies", International Peacekeeping, Vol. 9,
No. 3 (2002), pp. 87–102; Gwendolyn Sasse, "The European Neighbourhood Policy and Conﬂict Manage-
ment: A Comparison of Moldova and the Caucasus", Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2009), pp. 369–386;
Nathalie Tocci, "Conﬂict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing EU Involvement in Turkey’s
Kurdish Question and in the Israeli–Palestinian Conﬂict", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005),
pp. 125–146; Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The European Union as a Global Conﬂict
Manager (London: Routledge, 2012); Whitman and Wolff, "The EU as a Conﬂict Manager?", op. cit.
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violent conﬂict6 within and between states in a speciﬁc, pre-determined geo-
graphic region and a single intervening actor.7
This geographic ‘pre-determination’ of our empirical material clearly deﬁnes our
choice of cases, but also creates an opportunity to structure and organise our analy-
sis in a way that can contribute new knowledge and understanding of the under-
lying drivers of the EU’s foreign and security policy. Here, a longstanding debate
pits advocates of the human security approach against more traditional realists
of various persuasions.8 Much existing work in this area is focused on single or
few case studies9 or a single region,10 or assesses civilian and/or military EU oper-
ations as a whole,11 but no cross-regional comparison as carried out here exists to
our knowledge. We can thus not only investigate broader claims about underlying
drivers of EU foreign and security policy but also offer insights into whether the
6. We deﬁne violent conﬂict as the sustained and strategic use of violence by organised actors to
defend or change an existing status quo.
7. We do not claim that the EU is a homogeneous actor or that all its institutions and member states
have identical interests in relation to conﬂict management in the wider neighbourhood as this term is
used here. But we are concerned with EU policies and their impact, rather than with the (EU-internal)
process of policy making that involves often complex negotiations among representatives of the
member states and EU institutions. On EU actorness, including in relation to EU external action, see,
for example, Jolyon Howorth, "Decision-Making in Security and Defense Policy: Towards Supranational
Inter-Governmentalism?", Cooperation and Conﬂict, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2012), pp. 433–453; Jörg Monar, "The
EU’s Externalisation of Internal Security Objectives: Perspectives after Lisbon and Stockholm", The Inter-
national Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2010), pp. 23–39; Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton, "EU External
Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness", International Relations, Vol. 27,
No. 3 (2013), pp. 261–275; Thomas Risse, "Identity Matters: Exploring the Ambivalence of EU Foreign
Policy", Global Policy, Vol. 3 (2012), pp. 87–95.
8. Cf. George Christou, "The European Union’s Human Security Discourse: Where Are We Now?",
European Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014), pp. 364–381; Karen Del Biondo, "Norms or Interests? Explaining
Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion in Africa", JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Vol. 53, No. 2 (2015), pp. 237–254; Richard Youngs, "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the
EU’s External Identity", JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004), pp. 415–435.
9. For example, Alina Christova, "Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq",
Journal of Contemporary European Research, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2012), pp. 424–439; Hylke Dijkstra, "The Military
Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad Politics", International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2010), pp. 395–407; David Styan, "EU Power and ArmedHumanitarianism in
Africa: Evaluating ESDP in Chad", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2012) 651–668;
Whitman and Wolff, "The EU as a Conﬂict Manager?", op. cit.
10. For example, Gordon Crawford, "EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Central Asia:
From Lofty Principles to Lowly Self-Interests", Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 9, No.
2 (2008), pp. 172–191; Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "The EU in Africa: Peacebuilding by Proxy" (Oslo:
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2013); Norheim-Martinsen, "Our Work Here Is Done: Euro-
pean Union Peacekeeping in Africa", African Security Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2011), pp. 17–28; Gorm Rye
Olsen, "The EU and Military Conﬂict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?", Inter-
national Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2009), pp. 245–260; Annemarie Peen Rodt and Jide Martyns Okeke,
"AU–EU ’Strategic Partnership’: Strengthening Policy Convergence and Regime Efﬁcacy in the African
Peace and Security Complex?", African Security, Vol. 6, Nos. 3–4 (2013), pp. 211–233.
11. For example, Bastian Giegerich, "Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-Led Crisis-Management
Operations", Adelphi Series, Vol. 50, No. 414 (2010), pp. 41–58; Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel
Keohane (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (Paris: EU Institute for Security
Studies, 2009); Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, "The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons
from the UN and EU Experience", International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2010), pp. 211–224; Whitman
and Wolff, The European Union as a Global Conﬂict Manager, op. cit.
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increasing regional differentiation in this area of EU policy also implies a difference
in underlying drivers.12
The literature on EU foreign and security policy offers different conceptualis-
ations of “drivers”, variously seeing them as actors (e.g., individual member
states with a speciﬁc agenda), the underlying motivations that these actors are
said to have (e.g., desires for security) or as structures that “compel” the EU to
undertake certain actions (e.g., the international trade system). These are not
mutually exclusive conceptions of drivers; rather, they operate, interact and
compete at different levels.13 Our own use of “drivers” is primarily that of motiv-
ations, and we distinguish between a norms-driven and a utility-driven EU policy14
in the wider neighbourhood. This maps onto the distinction we draw in the title of
our article between a norms-driven policy informed by the human security
approach and a utility-driven policy that seeks greater European security in the
sense of greater security for the EU and its citizens and member states. This is
not to argue that such a European security focus does not have its own normative
underpinnings or to suggest that the deﬁnition of norms at EU level is not, in part, a
reﬂection of member states’ interests,15 but to engage with an established debate16
on whether the EU is a normative power,17 i.e., an actor who has the ability to
project the norms of peace, liberty, rule of law, democracy and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and make them part of an internationally
accepted conception of normal.18 In fact, as we argue below, the pursuit of Euro-
pean security is perfectly compatible with a human security approach, and it
appears from our study that the EU applies a human security approach, albeit pre-
dominantly in an instrumental way, in particular in those areas where it also has the
strongest security interests of its own.
In order to offer an empirically and analytically useful examination of the EU’s
responses to conﬂicts in the wider neighbourhood and of the variations in the
12. The idea of cross-regional comparisons in security studies goes back to Barry Buzan’s concept of
the regional security complex (Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First
Century", International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 3 (1991)), pp. 431–451 and was further developed in D.A.
Lake and P.M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (State College: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1997) and Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of Inter-
national Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Stefan Wolff, "The Regional
Dimensions of State Failure", Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2011), pp. 951–972.
13. For example, Michael Smith, "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a
Post-Modern Policy Framework?", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2003), p. 566,
argues that “three speciﬁc ‘drivers’ or motivations” exist for European foreign policy, namely “the
search for legitimacy; the interests of member states; and the demand for environmental stabilisation”,
and that these, in turn, “interact with the three layers of… ideas, institutions, and policy”.
14. Gergana Noutcheva, "Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s Normative
Power in the Western Balkans", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 7 (2009), pp. 1065–1084.
15. Thomas Diez, "Normative Power as Hegemony", Cooperation and Conﬂict, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2013), pp.
194–210.
16. Sandra Lavenex, "EU External Governance in ’Wider Europe’", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.
11, No. 4 (2004), pp. 680–700; Noutcheva, op. cit.; Sarah Wolff, Nicole Wichmann and Gregory Mounier,
"The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?", Journal
of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), pp. 9–23.
17. Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads", Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 182–199; Manners, "European Union ‘Normative Power’
and the Security Challenge", European Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2006) 405–421.
18. Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", JCMS: Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 235–258.
4 Argyro Kartsonaki and Stefan Wolff
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EU’s policies and their impact on the ground, we proceed as follows. After a
brief discussion of our analytical framework, we present an overview of all con-
ﬂicts among and between the neighbours’ neighbours. This overview is broken
down ﬁrst by sub-region (Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa Middle East, Central Asia)
because the EU structures much of its foreign and security policy on the basis
of increasingly regional differentiation and the development of regional strat-
egies.19 Second, we consider the different types of conﬂict that the EU is con-
fronted with, based on insights from the conﬂict management literature. Here
we consider whether conﬂicts occur within or between states. Among intra-
state conﬂicts, we identify three principal, albeit often overlapping, types of con-
ﬂict—territorial (secessionist or autonomist); regime (religious or ethnic); and
inter-communal (sectarian or resource competition). Inter-state conﬂicts, of
which there are signiﬁcantly fewer, are either disputes over borders, territory
or resources. In a third step, we map the EU’s responses to these conﬂicts, focus-
ing on the policies that the Union has applied in different cases, from a range of
humanitarian assistance programmes to civilian and military CSDP missions.20
On the basis of this descriptive overview, we then offer a comparative analysis
to identify and explain existing variation in terms of EU responses to conﬂicts
in the wider neighbourhood, ﬁnding that the EU adopts elements of the
human security approach most consistently in cases where it can also be con-
sidered to have signiﬁcant security interests of its own. This suggests an instru-
mental use of the human security approach in pursuit of European security
interests and also offers an explanation for the fact that the human security
approach is less in evidence in those cases where the Union’s own security inter-
ests have been less at stake.
Human or European Security: Determining the Principles of EU Foreign and
Security Policy
The concept of human security has its origins in academic and policy debates
stretching back to the 1990s that sought to take account of a range of initially dis-
parate trends in security studies and practice, including a basic human needs
approach, increasingly humanitarian interventionist foreign policies, a focus on
development as part of security, and the rise of so-called non-traditional security
issues.21 While at times questioned in terms of its utility as both an analytical
19. The relevant regional strategies in our context are the EU’s Sahel Strategy, European External
Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel" (Brussels: European External
Action Service, 2011) and Central Asia Strategy, European Commission, "European Community
Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007–2013" (Brussels: European
Commission, 2007); European Council, "Strategy Paper 2002–2006 & Indicative Programme 2002–2004
for Central Asia" (Brussels: European Council, 2002).
20. As of 31 July 2014, in the relevant area of the wider neighbourhood, the EU had ongoing civilian
missions in Mali, Niger and Libya and a military mission in Mali. Completed civilian missions in the
wider neighbourhood include Iraq (2005–2013) and South Sudan (2012–2014). A single military
mission was completed in Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) (2008–2009). A combined civilian-mili-
tary mission was undertaken in support of the African Union’s enhanced Mission to Sudan/Darfur
(2005–2006).
21. For a summary, see Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism", International Studies
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2001), pp. 239–251.
EU Responses to Conﬂicts in its Wider Neighbourhood 5
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concept and a practical guide for policy makers,22 the concept has remained signiﬁ-
cant in the context of continuing debates over the role of the European Union as an
international security actor. As we outline in the following paragraphs, human
security as conceptualised by Kaldor, Martin and Selchow23 provides a useful
analytical lens through which the debate over whether EU foreign and security
policy is primarily driven by interests or norms and values24 can be approached.
This debate, and in particular the question over the compatibility of the human
security approach with one that is focused on the EU’s own security needs, is at
the core of our study on EU responses to conﬂict in the wider neighbourhood.
The human security approach to EU foreign and security policy has its origins in
the wake of the publication of the European Union’s ﬁrst security strategy25 when
the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities put forward a report advocating
a human security doctrine for Europe.26 Subsequently, the study group’s convener,
Mary Kaldor, and two of her colleagues followed up on this report with a publi-
cation arguing that “[h]uman security could be considered a ‘bridging concept’
between the immediate need for stabilization and the need, simultaneously and
over the long term, to address… structural conditions”.27 As a guide for policy, a
human security approach to the EU’s foreign and security policy would thus
entail ﬁve principles: respect for human rights, the establishment of legitimate pol-
itical authority in countries the EU engages with through its foreign and security
policy, multilateralism as a counterweight to possible neo-colonial tendencies, a
bottom-up approach that takes note of local needs and interests, and ﬁnally a
regional focus that looks beyond just the country in question.28 The following
year, the “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”
noted conﬁdently that “[w]e have worked to build human security, by reducing
poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting
development, and addressing the root causes of conﬂict and insecurity”.29 While
this may not actually reﬂect any real commitment by the EU to a foreign and secur-
ity policy guided by the concept of human security, “the principles that underpin
22. Edward Newman, "Critical Human Security Studies", Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1
(2010), pp. 77–94; Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", International Security, Vol.
26, No. 2 (2001), pp. 87–102.
23. Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for
Europe", International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2007), pp. 273–288.
24. Del Biondo, op. cit.; Jolyon Howorth, "The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand
Bargain?", JCMS: Journal of CommonMarket Studies, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2010), pp. 455–474; Manners, "Norma-
tive Power", op. cit.; Manners, "European Union ‘Normative Power’", op. cit.; Richard Youngs, "Fusing
Security and Development: Just Another Euro-Platitude?", Journal of European Integration, Vol. 30, No.
3 (2008) 419–437; Youngs, "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests", op. cit.
25. Council of the European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy"
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003).
26. Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe" (Barce-
lona: Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004). Three years later, another report was pub-
lished taking stock of how far human security had become a strategic driver of European foreign and
security policy and offering a number of concrete recommendations on how to take this agenda
forward. See Human Security Study Group, "A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the
Human Security Study Group Comprising a Proposal and Background Report" (Madrid: Human Secur-
ity Study Group, 2007).
27. Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, op. cit., p. 281.
28. Ibid., pp. 282–286.
29. Council of the European Union, "Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strat-
egy: Providing Security in a Changing World" (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008), p. 2.
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the approach and the main themes that characterise it are visible in the work done
by the EU”.30
European security, as we deﬁne it for the purposes of this study, is about
maximising security for the EU and its citizens and member states. In terms
of the EU’s foreign and security policy, this can be understood as the pursuit
of EU internal security objectives with foreign policy tools, and has featured
in a signiﬁcant body of literature under the heading of externalisation of
internal security objectives.31 The most frequent security threats identiﬁed in
this debate, and of particular relevance to our study, include international ter-
rorism, transnational organised crime and illegal migration.32 In dealing with
these threats, the EU has employed a variety of foreign policy tools, including
military and civilian CSDP/Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mis-
sions, technical assistance and training programmes. The application of such
policies as a response to conﬂict in the wider neighbourhood, thus, would
suggest underlying European security concerns driving, at least in part, the for-
mulation of EU foreign and security policy in this respect.
Based on this conceptualisation of human versus European security, we will now
empirically test the extent to which the underlying principles of either are reﬂected
in EU policy making vis-à-vis countries in the wider neighbourhood. In examining
EU policies aimed at achieving greater security for the EU and those focusing on
the human dimension of security in the wider neighbourhood across our set of
cases, wewill establish how far principles of respect for human rights, the establish-
ment of legitimate political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach and a
regional focus have shaped EU policy. Analysing variation across cases sub-
sequently allows us not only to identify differences in the EU’s approach but also
to examine how ‘ﬂexible’ the Union’s approach is to abiding by the principles of
a human security doctrine.
Mapping Conﬂicts and EU Responses in the Wider Neighbourhood
Conﬂicts in the Wider Neighbourhood: A Sub-regional Overview
The EU introduced the concept of the “neighbours’ neighbours” in a 2006 Com-
munication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.
With reference to the need for enhanced regional cooperation, the Commission
stated that “[w]e should also look beyond the Union’s immediate neighbourhood,
to work with ‘the neighbours of our neighbours’”.33 While not very speciﬁc on
which countries would be considered as the neighbours’ neighbours, mention
was made of Central Asia and the Gulf, as well as Kazakhstan.
30. Christou, op. cit., p. 378.
31. Lavenex, op. cit.; Derek Lutterbeck, "Blurring the Dividing Line: The Convergence of Internal and
External Security inWestern Europe", European Security, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2005), pp. 231–253; Monar, op. cit.;
Wyn Rees, "Inside Out: The External Face of EU Internal Security Policy", Journal of European Integration,
Vol. 30, No. 1 (2008), pp. 97–111; SarahWolff, "TheMediterranean Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism",
Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2009), pp. 137–156; Wolff, Wichmann and Mounier, op. cit.
32. Rees, op. cit., p. 99.
33. Commission of the European Communities, "Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy" (Brussels: Com-
mission of the European Communities, 2006), p. 11.
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Our own approach to the issue of which countries to cover as part of the wider
neighbourhood proceeds from the EU’s immediate neighbours. In its southern
dimension, the ENP in North Africa covers Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and
Egypt,34 and in the Middle East Israel and the Palestinian territories, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria. In the eastern dimension, ENP partner countries are
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Thus, the neighbours’ neighbours, and hence the countries we focus on in the fol-
lowing, are Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan/South Sudan; Saudi
Arabia,35 Iraq and Iran; as well as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.36 Any such
purely geographic distinction, however, is overly arbitrary and does not fully
take account of geopolitical dynamics. We therefore include the three remaining
states of former Soviet Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in
our study, not least because of the various regional dynamics tying these countries
to each other and to the EU that have resulted in a speciﬁc Central Asia strategy of
the EU.37
This selection of countries presents us with a range of different conﬂicts within
and between states (see Table 1). Intra-state conﬂicts are clearly more prevalent
than inter-state conﬂicts. Of the latter kind, the territorial dispute between Sudan
and South Sudan has been the one with the highest levels of violence (most of
which occurred just before and after South Sudan became an independent state
in 2011) and with the greatest potential for further escalation.38 In contrast, inter-
state conﬂicts in Central Asia (over water and borders) have been mostly non-
violent and are unlikely to turn into major armed hostilities in the near future.39
Intra-state conﬂicts abound across the wider neighbourhood. At the time of
writing (January 2015), there are 19 such conﬂicts across 11 countries. Four of
these conﬂicts are internationalised (drawing in one or more other state actor,
usually a neighbouring state) and eight have a transnational dimension (involving
a non-state actor, which is in all but two cases an international terrorist network).
Almost half of these conﬂicts are territorial in nature, and the predominant trajec-
tory of such territorial disputes is secessionist. Of the seven regime conﬂicts, three
are driven by ethno-political disputes and four are linked with Islamist insurgen-
cies. There were also three inter-communal conﬂicts, centred, respectively, on
resource, sectarian and territorial disputes.
This categorisation, however, masks an often more complex reality on the
ground, in which different dimensions of our classiﬁcation overlap and change
over time. For example, the current conﬂict in Mali has its roots in longstanding
34. Libya is a southern EU neighbour and has been eligible for, and beneﬁted from, funding under the
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument/European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI/ENI), even
though it is not formally part of the ENP.
35. There is armed violence in Saudi Arabia, perpetrated by radical Islamists against Western and
Saudi government targets, but it does not constitute a conﬂict in the sense the term is used here.
36. In Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, there has been relatively little armed violence since the dissol-
ution of the Soviet Union, certainly not conﬂict in the sense the term is used here.
37. European Commission, "European Community Regional Strategy Paper", op. cit.
38. Stefan Wolff, "South Sudan’s Year One: Managing the Challenges of Building a New State", RUSI
Journal, Vol. 157, No. 5 (2012), pp. 46–54.
39. Thomas Bernauer and Tobias Siegfried, "Climate Change and International Water Conﬂict in
Central Asia", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2012), pp. 227–239; John Heathershaw and Nick
Megoran, "Contesting Danger: A New Agenda for Policy and Scholarship on Central Asia", International
Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (2011), pp. 589–612.
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Table 1. Conﬂicts in the Wider Neighbourhood
Country Parties Years Level of conﬂict Type of conﬂict
Sudan GoSudan, GoSouth Sudan 2011– Inter-state Territorial (Abyei)
Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan
GoKazakhstan, GoTurkmenistan,
GoUzbekistan
1991– Inter-state Inter-state resource conﬂict (water/Syr
Darya, non-violent)
Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
GoTurkmenistan, GoKazakhstan,
GoUzbekistan, GoKyrgyzstan,
GoTajikistan, GoRussia, GoChina,
GoAfghanistan
1991– Inter-state Border disputes (occasional clashes, but
predominantly non-violent)
Sudan/South Sudan GoSudan, GoSouth Sudan, various
nomadic tribes (Miseriya, Lou Nuer,
Murle, Ngok Dinka)
2009– Intra-state
(transnational)
Inter-communal/resources
Iraq Sunni and Shi’a militias, including AQ
in Iraq
2003– Intra-state
(transnational)
Inter-communal/sectarian
Chad GoChad, various northern rebel
groups, Sudan
2005–2010 Intra-state (internationalised)
Regime/ethno-political
Kyrgyzstan GoKyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks 1990, 2010 Intra-state Regime/ethno-political
South Sudan GoSouth Sudan, various SPLM
splinter groups
2011– Intra-state (internationalised)
Regime/ethno-political
Mali GoMali, Salaﬁst Group for Preaching
and Combat/AQIM
2002– Intra-state
(transnational)
Regime/Islamist insurgency
Kyrgyzstan GoKyrgyzstan, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and others (e.g., Hizb ut-
Tahrir)
1999– Intra-state
(transnational)
Regime/Islamist insurgency (decreasing
levels of activity since early 2000s)
Uzbekistan Go, Uzbekistan, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan, and others (e.g., Hizb
ut-Tahrir)
1999– Intra-state
(transnational)
Regime/Islamist insurgency (decreasing
levels of activity since early 2000s)
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Table 1. Continued.
Country Parties Years Level of conﬂict Type of conﬂict
Tajikistan GoTajikistan, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and others (e.g., Hizb ut-
Tahrir)
1999–,
2008, 2009,
2010, 2012
Intra-state
(transnational)
Regime/Islamist insurgency (decreasing
levels of activity since early 2000s,
increasingly localised thereafter in and
around Rasht, including Kamarob gorge
and Gorno-Badakhshan province)
Sudan GoSudan, Janjaweed, various Darfur
rebel groups
2002– Intra-state Territorial/autonomist
Sudan GoSudan, Eastern Front 2004–2006 Intra-state Territorial/autonomist
Iraq GoIraq, Kurdistan Regional
Government
2003– Intra-state Territorial/autonomist (inter-communal/
territorial) (Kirkuk and disputed
territories)
Iran GoIran, Party for a Free Life in
Kurdistan
2004– Intra-state
(transnational)
Territorial/secessionist
Mali GoMali, Tuareg rebels 2007–2009 Intra-state Territorial/secessionist
Mauritania GoMauritania, POLISARIO/Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
1975– Intra-state (internationalised)
Territorial/secessionist
Niger GoNiger, Tuareg rebels 2007–2009 Intra-state Territorial/secessionist
Sudan GoSudan, SPLM 1983–2005 Intra-state Territorial/secessionist
Sudan GoSudan, SPLM-North 2011– Intra-state (internationalised)
Territorial/secessionist
(territorial/
autonomist)
Mali GoMali, Tuareg rebels, AQIM 2012– Intra-state
(transnational)
Territorial/secessionist (regime/Islamist
insurgency)
Notes: aCategorisation here relates to the level where the conﬂict predominantly occurs. We note any transnational (involving other non-state actors as conﬂict parties) or
internationalised (involving other state actors as conﬂict parties) dimensions in parentheses.
b At the inter-state level, we distinguish between border (demarcation) conﬂicts, territorial disputes and resource-driven conﬂicts. At the intra-state level, we distinguish
between inter-communal, territorial and regime conﬂicts at the intra-state level and note further speciﬁcation (sectarian or resource-driven; secessionist or autonomist;
ethno-political or Islamist). Secondary drivers are noted in parentheses.
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grievances among the Tuareg, but has become inextricably intertwined with the
activities of jihadist and criminal networks across the Sahel and Maghreb
regions.40 Similarly, the territorial dispute over Kirkuk in Iraq has been multi-
dimensional for all of the post-2003 period with the status of the territory being con-
tested between Baghdad and Erbil at the national level and local communities
struggling to agree on acceptable governance arrangements in Kirkuk.41 At the
same time, recent developments in Iraq/Syria have added an obvious transnational
dimension to it with Islamic State becoming another signiﬁcant actor in the struggle
for Kirkuk and its hydrocarbon resources.42
Beyond the complexities of individual conﬂicts, there are also clear links between
these conﬂicts, and between them and conﬂicts in the more immediate neighbour-
hood, i.e., the countries covered by the ENP. Again, the situation in Mali can serve
as an illustrative example with links to the Tuareg conﬂict in neighbouring Niger,
the spill-over effects of the violent regime change in Libya in 2011, including the
ﬂow of arms and ﬁghters into and through Niger, and the spreading Islamist vio-
lence in Algeria and Mauretania from 2006/7 onwards.43 The numerous conﬂicts
within and between Sudan and South Sudan are similarly embedded in a
complex web of local and transnational interest structures.44
The security challenges that the countries under consideration here face combine
with a range of other challenges related to the general capacity of institutions to
tackle threats effectively and the living conditions of the countries’ populations.
All of these countries have been classiﬁed at least as weak states in the annual
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index since 2006.45 None of them was considered
free by Freedom House in 2014 and many of them have never been even partially
free.46 As a consequence, EU responses to conﬂicts in the wider neighbourhood
need to be considered in this wider context of policies formulated and implemented
in low-capacity, non-democratic states. This, in turn, would make the adoption of a
human security approach as suggested by Kaldor, Martin and Selchow47 all the
more relevant as it offers a framework in which policies aimed at long-term struc-
tural conﬂict prevention can be combined with short-term efforts to tackle immedi-
ate security and humanitarian needs.
40. Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, "The Malian Crisis and Its Actors", The International Spectator,
Vol. 48, No. 3 (2013), pp. 78–97; Gorm Rye Olsen, "Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: The USA and
the European Union in Somalia and Mali", European Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014), pp. 290–306.
41. Stefan Wolff, "Governing (in) Kirkuk", International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6 (2010), pp. 1361–1379.
42. Gareth Stansﬁeld, "The Islamic State, the Kurdistan Region and the Future of Iraq: Assessing UK
Policy Options", International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6 (2014), pp. 1329–1350; Dodge and Hokayem, op. cit.
43. Jesús Díez Alcalde, "Mali: Security, Democracy and Development to Overcome the Conﬂict", Paper
presented at the Geopolitical Overview of Conﬂicts Conference, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies,
Madrid, 2013; Claire Mills, Arabella Lang and Jon Lunn, "The Crisis in Mali: Current Military Action and
Upholding Humanitarian Law" (London: House of Commons Library, 2013).
44. Alex de Waal, "When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South
Sudan", African Affairs, Vol. 113, No. 452 (2014), pp. 347–369; International Crisis Group, "Sudan’s
Spreading Conﬂict (i): War in South Kordofan" (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013); International
Crisis Group, "Sudan’s Spreading Conﬂict (ii): War in Blue Nile" (Brussels: International Crisis Group,
2013); Karly Kupferberg and Stefan Wolff, "Sudan: ’Successful’ Constitutional Reform Spurs Localized
Violence", in Alan J. Kuperman (ed.), Constitutions and Conﬂict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil
War through Institutional Design (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
45. Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index" (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2014).
46. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2014" (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2014).
47. Kaldor, Martin and Selchow, op. cit.
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EU Actions in the Wider Neighbourhood
The mapping exercise in the preceding section has, perhaps unsurprisingly,
revealed that the EU faces a diverse and ﬂuid picture of conﬂicts across its wider
neighbourhood. Understanding EU responses to these conﬂicts initially requires
a similar stock-taking exercise to provide a clearer picture of the kinds of policies
the EU has developed and implemented vis-à-vis individual countries and
entire sub-regions. In the following, we offer an overview of EU policies in
the wider neighbourhood, focusing primarily on two types of policies—humanitar-
ian and security/stability—outlining the way in which they do (or do not)
incorporate the ﬁve principles of human security established by Kaldor, Martin
and Selchow.48
EU Policies in the Sahel
The Sahel region is one of the poorest and most environmentally damaged places
on Earth. It faces numerous challenges related to extreme poverty and food crises,
which are further exacerbated by signiﬁcant demographic challenges—population
growth, transmigration and emigration.49 The region also suffers from social and
gender inequality, internal tensions, institutional weakness and fragile governance,
leading to a growth in organised crime, radicalisation and increasingly violent
extremism, including that connected with global terrorist networks and their
regional afﬁliates.50 This is evident in the number and nature of conﬂicts that
have affected the region: a succession of internationalised territorial conﬂicts in
Mali, Niger and Mauretania, partly overlapping with a wider regional
Islamist insurgency threatening regimes particularly in Mali and Niger, and an
ethno-political challenge to the regime in Chad, which in turn is linked with the
Darfur conﬂict in neighbouring Sudan.
The consequent security threats were recognised by the EU and a series of policy
responses were brought together in the Union’s regional strategy for the Sahel,51
combining actions primarily aimed at humanitarian relief and combatting
insecurity and terrorism.
Actions for security and stability
Along with the extreme poverty and famine that plague the Sahel countries,
insecurity and terrorism come to add to the difﬁculties of the region. The EU,
recognising the inter-dependence of security and development, launched in
2011 the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The objective of
the strategy is to tackle the root causes of extreme poverty and also to eliminate
security threats, leading these countries in sustainable development, by focusing
mainly on reduction of insecurity, strengthening of governance and stability
48. Ibid.
49. European External Action Service, "Fact Sheet: The European Union and the Sahel" (Brussels: Euro-
pean Union External Action, 2014).
50. Daniel Fiott et al., "The Sahel Crisis: Where Do European and African Perspectives Meet?", IES
Policy Brief, No. 02/2013 (2013); Robert Muggah and Steven Zyck, "Region in Crisis: Stabilizing Mali
and the Sahel", Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2013).
51. European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel", op. cit.
12 Argyro Kartsonaki and Stefan Wolff
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:22
 28
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
through promotion of rule of law, human rights and socio-economic develop-
ment, as well as prevention of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
attacks both in regional and EU territory and the elimination of drugs and
other criminal trafﬁcking.52
Today, this strategy continues to provide the basis for EU action and has proven
to be a valuable tool “to help countries in the wider Sahel-Sahara region to address
key security and development challenges”.53 After its establishment three impor-
tant CSDP missions were launched in the region, i.e., the EUCAP Sahel Niger,
the EUTM Mali and the EUCAP Sahel Mali. The purpose of the missions was to
assist the governments of these states to overcome the conﬂicts besetting them.
As noted in Table 1, these conﬂicts were internal, territorial conﬂicts, triggered
mainly by actions of Tuareg rebels and Islamic insurgent groups.
In more detail, the EUCAP Sahel Niger is a civilian mission that aims to advise
and train the Nigerian authorities in order to improve their capacities in combat-
ing terrorism and organised crime. This will be possible through the regional and
international coordination of actions against terrorism and organised crime, the
reinforcement of Niger’s security and rule of law and more effective management
of resources. For this purpose the EU has engaged an authorised force of
80 personnel and so far the EUCAP Sahel Niger’s experts have trained around
3,000 members of the country’s internal security forces, armed forces and
judiciary.54
In Niger, the EU, apart from the EUCAP Sahel Niger, had launched the Support
Programme for Justice and the Rule of Law, PAJED I and PAJED II.55 Their goal was
to strengthen the ﬁght against organised crime and reinforce and reform the
Niger’s justice sector by creating a specialised chamber to deal with terrorism
and trafﬁcking. PAJED II, continuing in the steps of PAJED I, was based on four
components that responded to judicial institutions’most urgent needs, combining
the improvement of infrastructure and equipment, institutional support and the
strengthening of judicial actors’ capacities.56 In particular the EU targets the re-
establishment and/or reinforcement of the administrative presence of the state,
especially in the north of Niger.
Following the adoption by the Malian National Assembly of the Transition
Roadmap on 29 January 2013, the EU decided to support AFISMA57 and to
launch the EUTM Mali.58 The latter is committed to restoring political authority
and democratic order through the implementation of the roadmap, which foresees
an electoral calendar and the prospect of negotiations with the North. The EUTM
Mali was mandated to help the Malian authorities “to exercise fully their sover-
eignty over the whole of the country and neutralise organised crime and terrorist
52. Ibid.
53. European External Action Service, "Fact Sheet: The European Union and the Sahel", op. cit.
54. "EUCAP Sahel Niger Civilian Mission" (Brussels: European Union External Action Service, 2014).
55. European Commission, "The EU Reinforces Its Support for Development and Security in Niger"
(Brussels: European Commission, 2013).
56. European External Action Service, "Bonne Gouvernance", Délégation d’Union Européenne en
République du Niger, available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/niger/eu_niger/dev_coop/
governance/index_fr.htm> (accessed 23 January 2015).
57. European Commission, "Donor Conference onMali: EU Pledges €50Million to Support an African-
Led Peace Operation (AFISMA)" (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).
58. Union Européenne Action Extérieure, "Mission de Formation de l’UE au Mali (EUTM Mali)"
(Union Européenne Action Extérieure, Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune, 2014).
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threats” that plague the country.59 The mandate of the mission was extended up to
2016, allowing the training of four additional battalions of the Malian armed
forces.60 At the same time, the Council approved additional activities for the
mission; during its renewedmandate, the operation will establish twomobile train-
ing teams that will follow up on the battalions previously trained, once they have
returned to their garrisons, and “Train the Trainers” programmes will contribute to
the sustainability of the mission’s efforts.61
In addition to the military EUTMMali mission, the EU decided in 2014 to deploy
a civilian mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali. Promoting the establishment of legitimate
political authority, its objective will be to “allow the Malian authorities to restore
and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting
peace in Mali, and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy through-
out the territory of Mali”.62 For this purpose the EUCAP Sahel Mali personnel will
assist and advise the Malian Internal Security Forces (ISF), i.e., police, gendarmerie
and National Guard, to improve their operational efﬁciency, re-establish their
respective chains of command, reinforce the role of judicial and administrative
authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions,
and facilitate their redeployment to the North.63
Furthermore, after the crisis in Mali and the French intervention, the EU sent
European External Action Service (EEAS) Crisis Response Department personnel
to the Bamako EUDelegation to support the implementation of a short-term Instru-
ment for Stability (IfS)64 package, which focused on the restoration of security and
protection of civilians, providing immediate support to Malian local authorities,
promotion of dialogue and reconciliation initiatives, and reduction of radicalisation
and violent extremism.65 Under the IfS, the EU had also supported in the past the
“Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement au Nord Mali”,
whose main objective was to reduce insecurity and terrorism in Northern Mali
through the restoration of the state’s security and administrative presence in 11
strategic sites called Secure Centres for Development and Governance.66
59. European External Action Service, "EU TrainingMission inMali (EUTMMali)" (Brussels: European
External Action Service, 2014).
60. Council of the European Union, "EU TrainingMission in Mali Extended" (Luxembourg: Council of
the European Union, 2014).
61. Ibid.
62. Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014 on the European
Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)" (Luxembourg: Ofﬁcial Journal of the European
Union, 2014).
63. Ibid.
64. The Instrument for Stability (IfS) was launched in 2007 as a follow-up to the Rapid Reaction Mech-
anism and has signiﬁcantly intensiﬁed the European Commission’s work in the area of conﬂict preven-
tion, crisis management and peace building. The IfS focuses on a wide range of issues, such as support
for mediation activities, conﬁdence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transi-
tional justice and the role of natural resources in conﬂict. Under the IfS, these activities can be supported
in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when timely ﬁnancial help cannot be provided from other EU
sources. The IfS has so far been used to ﬁnance a large number of crisis response projects worldwide. The
largest share of funds was given to projects in Africa, the Asia-Paciﬁc and the Balkans, followed by the
Middle East and Latin America and the Caribbean.
65. European External Action Service, "Sahel—Crisis Response", available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/
crisis-response/where-we-work/sahel/index_en.htm>.
66. "Paix et Sécurité: Le Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement au Nord
Mali" (Brussels: European External Action Service, 2011).
14 Argyro Kartsonaki and Stefan Wolff
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 06
:22
 28
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Moreover, under the Joint EU–Africa Strategy, including actions in Mali, Maur-
itania and Niger, the EU seeks to promote holistic approaches to security, encom-
passing conﬂict prevention and long-term peace building, conﬂict resolution and
post-conﬂict reconstruction, trying to address the root causes of the conﬂicts indi-
cated in Table 1.67 In Mauritania, the EU also supports the comprehensive national
strategy to ﬁght terrorism and eliminate the threats posed by Al-Qaeda in the
country.68
Finally, in Chad/CAR, the EU, aiming to tackle the longstanding crisis in Darfur
in neighbouring Sudan, deployed a military mission (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) in
2008–2009. This was one of the most multinational missions ever authorised in
Africa, with 3,700 personnel from 26 EU and non-EU countries. The mission had
as its main objective to “contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particu-
larly refugees and displaced persons, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
aid”.69 To do so effectively required improvements to security in the area of oper-
ations to ensure the free movement of humanitarian aid workers and the mission’s
personnel, and to contribute to the protection of UN personnel, premises, installa-
tions and equipment.70
In 2009, the UN took over from EUFOR in both Chad and the CAR. However, the
Union has remained fully engaged in the region, with a number of member states
and third countries71 on the ground with the United Nations Mission in Central
African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and around 2,000 troops who served
in EUFOR becoming part of MINURCAT until the completion of the Mission's
mandate on 31 December 2010. In addition, the EU, emphasising the need for
the safe and permanent return of the displaced persons, continues to provide sub-
stantial funding for the creation of the necessary conditions through the Accompa-
nying Programme for Stabilisation. The IfS has also been used to ﬁnance
MINURCAT’s programme to train, equip and support the deployment of
Chadian police and gendarmes responsible for the security of the refugee camps
and sites for displaced persons in eastern Chad.72
Humanitarian actions
Since 2005, the Sahel region has suffered four food crises, caused mainly by poor
rainfall, failed harvests and rising food prices.73 The situation has deteriorated
further through the return of migrant workers from Libya, who have no job or
income.74 By 2014, the crisis had resulted in 1.5 million severely malnourished
67. European Commission, "Key Facts on the Joint Africa–EU Strategy" (Brussels: European Commis-
sion, 2013).
68. European External Action Service, "Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel", op. cit.
69. European Union, "EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African
Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)" (Brussels: European Union: European Security and Defence Policy,
2009).
70. Ibid.
71. Ireland, Austria, Finland, Poland, France, Albania, Croatia and Russia.
72. European Union, "EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African
Republic", op. cit.
73. European Commission, "AGIR—Building Resilience to Food and Nutrition Crisis in the Sahel &
West-Africa", (Brussels: European Commission, 2014).
74. European Commission, "The European Commission’s Response to the Food Crisis and Long-Term
Food Insecurity in the Sahel Region of Africa" (Brussels: European Commission, 2012).
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children, 20 million food-insecure people and 25 million people living in extreme
poverty without any social protection across the Sahel region.75
The Union’s main instrument for providing aid to countries in the Sahel is the
European Development Fund (EDF),76 which was ﬁrst launched in 1959.
Through the 11th EDF, the Sahel countries will beneﬁt from approximately €5
billion in funding to “tackle the speciﬁc and complex challenges of the Sahel
region: security and stability, development and resilience”.77 Governance, the
rule of law and security, delivery of social services, agriculture and food security,
regional trade and integration constitute the priorities of the development pro-
gramme from 2014 to 2020. In addition, the EU supported the establishment of
the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR), which aims to reduce chronic
and acute malnutrition and to signiﬁcantly increase the number of people who
have access to basic public goods. For this purpose, the EU has committed to mobi-
lising €1.5 billion in funding for regional and national programmes in the Sahel and
West Africa during 2014–2020.78
In order to address more effectively the needs of each receiving state, the EU uses
National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), according to which each partner country
will ﬁrst establish its priorities and then receive aid based on them. This is meant to
allow the EU to maximise the impact of the support provided by targeting
resources at those areas where they are most needed and can be most effective.79
Among the Sahel countries, Mauritania and Niger have their own NIPs.80 For
Mauritania, the NIP budgets €195 million for projects supporting the rule of law,
health, sustainable agriculture and food security. For Niger, the budget is €596
million, focused on social policies, food security, infrastructure, as well as security
and governance.
Furthermore, in Niger European aid for food security covers nearly one-third of
the overall needs of the population,81 whereas in Mali the EU supported Oxfam in
its efforts to assist 3,500 families to rebuild their livelihoods in the Kayes region.
Finally, in Chad the EU has supported international and local NGOs in their
ﬁght against acute malnutrition affecting some 56,000 people. In addition, €8
million was channelled through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) to
support Chad’s efforts to adapt to, and mitigate, the challenges raised by climate
change. The EU is Chad’s leading aid donor, with the target sectors being rule of
law and good governance at both central and local government levels, and sustain-
able development for infrastructure and the rural sector. Using Chad as an example
of the EU’s commitment to pursue policies driven by the principles of human secur-
ity, Andris Piebalgs, the European Commissioner for Development 2010–2014,
noted that “the EU wishes to act as a real partner for Chad, in addition to being
75. European Commission, “AGIR—Building Resilience”, op. cit.
76. Each EDF is directly ﬁnanced by the EU countries, has its own ﬁnancial regulation and is managed
outside the framework of the EU’s general budget.
77. European Commission, "EU Reinforces Its Support for the Sahel in the Years to Come" (Brussels:
European Commission, 2013).
78. "Kristalina Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid
and Crisis Response Speech: AGIR—One Year On" (Abidjan: European Commission, 2013).
79. Africa–EU Partnership, "Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014–2017, Pan-African Programme
2014–2020" (Africa-EU Partnership, 2014).
80. European Commission, "Signing of National Indicative Programmes with 16 ACP Countries"
(Brussels: European Commission, 2014).
81. European Commission, "AGIR—Building Resilience to Food and Nutrition Crisis", op. cit.
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its leading aid donor.We are promoting stability in the country and a strengthening
of the rule of law within a context of democracy and inclusive growth. In addition,
we are aware of the important role played by Chad in regional stability”.82
Summary
The EU’s responses to conﬂict in the Sahel are embedded in existing bilateral and
regional programmes, dating back more than half a century and having been tra-
ditionally focused on development and humanitarian aid. The escalation of con-
ﬂicts after 2011 in Niger and Mali prompted an intensiﬁcation of the Union’s
existing engagement. Under French leadership and based on a widely shared
threat perception,83 EU policy responses clearly reﬂected elements of the human
security approach. They were regional, multilateral and in good part bottom-
up. They also combined a security and stability response to an immediate
threat to these countries, the region and the Union and its member states with
a renewed broad focus on good governance (legitimate political authority and
human rights).
EU Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa
In many respects, the situation in sub-Saharan Africa is a mirror image of the Sahel
region, and the EU frequently expresses concerns about various interconnected
crises there. Sudan and South Sudan—the two countries that “ﬁt” with the deﬁ-
nition of the wider neighbourhood used here—have been similarly plagued by
the adverse consequences of natural and man-made disasters that mutually
reinforce an ongoing and escalating humanitarian crisis. Yet the EU’s actions
there are considerably less robust in comparison.
Actions for security and stability
At a continent-wide level, the EU is supporting African Union (AU)-led efforts in
the area of conﬂict prevention, management, resolution and peace building by
funding the African Peace Facility (APF) and supporting the African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA) with both political backing and substantial funding
of more than €1 billion over the past decade.84
More speciﬁcally in relation to Sudan and South Sudan, the Union has supported
international actions undertaken to end the conﬂict and ameliorate the situation in
Darfur. In 2005, it provided assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) and supported the AU’s political, military and police efforts for this
purpose.85 During its two-and-a-half-year term, the EU provided equipment and
assets, planning and technical assistance and deployed military observers. It
82. European Commission, "European Union Announces Increase in Development Aid for Chad for
2014–2020" (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).
83. Council of the European Union, "Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014", op. cit.
84. Nicoletta Pirozzi, "EU Support to African Security Architecture", European Union Institute for Secur-
ity Studies Occasional Paper 76 (2009).
85. European Union Council Secretariat, "EU Support to the African UnionMission in Darfur—AMIS"
(Brussels: European Union Council Secretariat, 2008).
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trained African troops, helped with tactical and strategic transportation and pro-
vided police assistance and training.86
Since the independence of South Sudan in 2011, relations between the EU, Sudan,
and South Sudan are regulated by the Comprehensive Approach document,87
according to which the EU seeks to promote the development and peaceful co-
existence of, and within, the two states. In an effort to end hostilities in and
between Sudan and South Sudan the EU imposed an arms embargo on both
countries88 and it also sanctioned military leaders for obstructing negotiations.89
More broadly, the EU has also encouraged the development of effective and
accountable governments, while it has reafﬁrmed that it will continue to contribute
to the coordination of international support under the overall leadership of the UN.
The EU, hence, reiterated its commitment “to engage both Sudan and South Sudan
in the promotion of democratic governance, respect for human rights and a peace-
ful and prosperous future for all Sudanese people”.90
The comprehensive approach is also evident in the EU’s bilateral relations with
Sudan. Apart from the conﬂict in Darfur, Sudan has faced more than a decade of vio-
lence and unrest in eastern Sudan and “inherited” a violent insurgency in South Kor-
dofan and Blue Nile states as a result of the secession of South Sudan in 2011.91 In
addition, the unresolved dispute with South Sudan over Abyei is a serious inter-
state, territorial conﬂict teetering on the brink of a full-scale inter-state war. As a
result, the EU has frequently called on the involved parties to end hostilities and
begin dialogue,92 condemned all actions against civilians and international personnel,
and endorsed all signed peace agreements and called on the parties to implement
them.93
Similarly, in relation to South Sudan, the EU responded positively to the request
of the government of South Sudan to help with the improvement of conditions at
Juba airport,94 originally a local airport managing mainly domestic ﬂights and
unable to meet the increased demands of international air trafﬁc after the coun-
try’s independence. The EUAVSEC South Sudan mission was launched to assist
the prevention of illegal trafﬁcking and terrorist actions against airports, aircraft,
crew and passengers, to provide training and mentoring security services, offer
86. European External Action Service, "EU Support to AMIS Darfur Mission Description", available:
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-support-amis-darfur/mission-
description/index_en.htm>.
87. Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan" (Luxembourg: Council of the
European Union, 2011).
88. European Commission, "Restrictive Measures in Force" (Brussels: European Commission, 2014).
89. Council of the European Union, "EU Imposes Sanctions on South Sudanese Military Leaders"
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014); European Commission, "Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) No 75/2014 of 27 January 2014" (Luxembourg: Ofﬁcial Journal of the European
Union, 2014).
90. Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Sudan", op. cit.
91. Kupferberg and Wolff, op. cit.
92. European Union, "European Union Calls on Sudan to Abstain from Acts and Statements that
Might Derail the Process of National Dialogue" (Khartoum: European Union: Delegation to the Republic
of Sudan, 2014).
93. Council of the European Union, "Foreign Affairs Council Meeting Conclusions on South Sudan"
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014).
94. Council of the European Union, "EUAVSEC South Sudan to Strengthen Aviation Security in South
Sudan" (Luxembourg: Council of the European Union, 2012).
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advice and assistance on aviation security and support the coordination of secur-
ity activities.95
Since the violent escalation of factional inﬁghting in South Sudan’s ruling party
in December 2013, the EU, together with Norway and the US (as well as the UK as
part of the original “troika”) has contributed to mediating peace talks between the
warring factions.
Humanitarian actions
The EU provides substantial humanitarian assistance to South Sudan mainly
through emergency responses and the provision of basic services. The EU also con-
tributes development funds focusing on basic health and education needs and the
improvement of the livelihoods of farmers, as well as for the ﬁght against corrup-
tion and the strengthening of institutions. Moreover, following a bottom-up
approach, the EU, in cooperation with the government of South Sudan and the
UN, “is taking forward the joint programming of development assistance in
several areas: justice/rule of law, education, health, water management, urban
development and the rural economy”.96 Additionally, under the “Everything but
Arms” initiative,97 the EU has committed to continue cooperation with South
Sudan on trade matters, aiming to offer duty-free and quota-free access to EU
markets.98 Finally, South Sudan requested accession to the Cotonou Agreement
and its membership is expected to provide a formal framework to address other
political, social and economic issues.99
Sudan, by contrast, has not ratiﬁed the revised Cotonou Agreement and there-
fore currently has no access to national allocations under the European Develop-
ment Funds. However, in mid-2010, the Council of the European Union
earmarked “Special Funds” from former EDF projects and additional unused
funds from the STABEX instrument, which were disbursed locally and regionally
in Sudan and South Sudan. Sudan also beneﬁts from annual grants under other
instruments, more speciﬁcally the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights, the Instrument for Stability and the Development Cooperation
Instrument thematic budget lines.100
Summary
In comparison to the Sahel region discussed earlier, the EU’s response to conﬂicts
within and between Sudan and South Sudan has been considerably less coherent
95. European External Action Service, “European Common Security and Defence Policy: European
Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan”, updated February 2014, available:
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/euavsec-south-sudan/pdf/factsheet_
euavsec_south-sudan_en.pdf> (accessed February 2015).
96. European Union External Action, "The EU and South Sudan" (Brussels: European Union External
Action, 2014).
97. European Commission, "Everything but Arms (EBA)—Who Beneﬁts?" (Brussels: European Com-
mission, 2013).
98. European External Action Service, "EU Relations with the Republic of South Sudan", available:
<http://eeas.europa.eu/south_sudan/index_en.htm>.
99. European External Action Service, "CSDP Mission to Strengthen Airport Security in South
Sudan", op. cit.
100. "Sudan", available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/sudan/index_en.htm>.
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and less well funded. As a consequence, and while the Union formally promotes a
range of human security objectives, it has done this so far less effectively, partly also
because of a lack of clear leadership by, and within, the EU. Bilateral relations with
both countries remain tense and easily susceptible to derailment by events on the
ground, which additionally diminishes the effectiveness of EU engagement. This,
and the lack of clear threats posed by Sudan and South Sudan to the EU and/or
individual member states, simultaneously decreases the incentives for the EU to
expend greater efforts on either country—with respect to its own and human secur-
ity concerns.
EU Policies in the Middle East
The Middle East has a long history of conﬂict and of EU engagement there, particu-
larly through the southern dimension of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy
and its predecessors. The Union’s neighbours’ neighbours relevant to this study are
Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. After the 2003 US-led military intervention in Iraq, the
EU has been closely engaged in the country’s recovery and reconstruction, contri-
buting both humanitarian aid and support for the restoration of stability and secur-
ity. The EU’s engagement with Iran relates primarily to the EU3–Iran negotiations
and the Union’s mediation of the P5+1 talks on Iran’s nuclear programme,101 and
we therefore do not include Iran in our analysis. Nor do we cover Saudi Arabia
as it does not experience conﬂicts in the sense we deﬁne them for the purposes
of this article.
Actions for security and stability
Two years after the 2003 military intervention the EU established the civilian
EUJUST LEX Iraq mission to “strengthen the rule of law and to promote a
culture of respect for human rights in Iraq by providing professional development
opportunities for high- and mid-level Iraqi ofﬁcials from the criminal justice
system”.102 Its mandate lasted from 2005 to 2013 and during this time more than
7,000 mid- and high-level Iraqi ofﬁcials were trained or mentored. The mission
covered all branches of the Iraqi criminal justice sector, trained judges and
prosecutors, enhancing their understanding of international judicial cooperation,
and also improved areas of the police and the penitentiary system.103 Efforts
were also made to strengthen local capacities in the ﬁght against domestic violence
and human trafﬁcking. Since the end of the mission’s mandate, the EU has contin-
ued to monitor the situation on the ground and responded appropriately when
necessary.104
101. Riccardo Alcaro and Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, "Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Issue: The Labours and
Sorrows of a Supporting Actor", The International Spectator, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2014), pp. 14–20; Lynne Dry-
burgh, "The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran", European Security, Vol. 17, Nos. 2–3 (2008),
pp. 253–271; Bernd Kaussler, "From Engagement to Containment: EU–Iran Relations and the Nuclear
Programme, 1992–2011", Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2012), pp. 53–76.
102. European External Action Service, "EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-
Iraq)" (Brussels: European External Action Service, 2014).
103. Daniel Korski, "EUJUST LEX (Iraq)", in Grevi, Helly and Keohane, op. cit.
104. European External Action Service, "EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX-
Iraq)", op. cit.
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Iraq remains beset by intra-state conﬂicts between its different ethnic and sectarian
groups. In light of the recent escalation of violence and the rise of Islamic State, the
EU committed to provide additional funds to mobilise the European Emergency
Response Coordination Centre105 and activate the European Civil Protection Mech-
anism,106 as well as to enhance EEAS presence in Erbil in the Kurdistan region of
Iraq.107 In addition, the Council welcomed the decision of individual member
states to provide military support to the Kurdish authorities ﬁghting against IS,
while it urged all UNmember states to implement sanctions against it as agreed.108
Humanitarian actions
Since 2003, the EU has contributed to the efforts to strengthen democracy, promote
human rights, boost economic growth and reduce poverty in Iraq. The improve-
ment of institutions in the areas of criminal justice, basic services, elections and
civil society organisations are considered to be critical for the achievement of
these objectives.
In addition, the EU regards closer economic ties to be an important aspect of Iraq’s
recovery and reconstruction and seeks to promote bilateral trade relations and
improve trade cooperation while also ensuring a minimum level of predictability,
transparency and legal certainty for economic operators, including EU-based inves-
tors in Iraq. A signiﬁcant step for closer cooperation was the signing of the Memor-
andum of Understanding on a Strategic Energy Partnership in 2010, which provides
a political framework for reinforcing energy relations between Iraq and the EU. It
also outlines priorities for future cooperation, emphasising the development of an
energy policy for the Iraqi people, energy security of supplies between Iraq and
the EU and renewable energy and energy efﬁciency measures.109
The EU has emphasised the need to reform basic services such as education, health
and infrastructure, with a particular focus on education with the aim of supporting
“Iraqi national efforts in achieving the Millennium Development Goals…which
have a strong two-way link to the peace consolidation process”.110 In order to estab-
lish an effective roadmap for targeting EU support in this context, the European
Commission, in cooperation with Italy, Germany and Sweden, drafted a Joint Strat-
egy Paper for 2011–2013 which focused on good governance, socio-economic recov-
ery and water management and agriculture as priority areas for support and on
105. The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) coordinates rapid responses to disasters
both inside and outside Europe using resources from 31 countries participating in the Union Civil Pro-
tection Mechanism. The ERCC collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, prepares plans
for the deployment of experts and equipment and works with member states to map the EU’s disaster
response by matching offers of assistance to the needs of the disaster-stricken country.
106. The EUCivil ProtectionMechanismwas established in 2001 to enable coordinated assistance from
the participating states to victims of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and elsewhere.
107. Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Iraq" (Brussels: Press Ofﬁce-General
Secretariat of the Council, 2014).
108. European External Action Service, "Joint Statement by the Third EU–LAS Ministerial Meeting on
the Security Situation in Iraq" (Athens: European Union External Action, 2014); Council of the European
Union, "Council Conclusions on Iraq", op. cit.
109. The Government of the Republic of Iraq and the EU, "Memorandum of Understanding between
the EU and the European Union on Strategic Partnership in Energy" (Baghdad, 2010).
110. EU, UNICEF and Government of Iraq, "UNICEF, European Union and Government of Iraq
Launch €17m Programme to Improve Primary Education in Iraq" (Baghdad, 2011).
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education and the strengthening of institutional capacity as priority actions, along-
side human rights, gender equality and the protection of vulnerable groups.111
In 2012, the EU and Iraq signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA), which provides a formal framework for dialogue and cooperation on the
above matters. The Union’s goals through the PCA are to promote internal and
regional stability through the closer engagement of Iraq with the international com-
munity. An additional target is to strengthen the institutions, the socio-economic
reforms and the development already taking place in the country.112
For the period 2014–2020, the EU plans to focus on strengthening human rights
and the rule of law, improving primary and secondary education and providing
access to sustainable energy for all.
Summary
The EU’s involvement in Iraq must be seen in the context of the deeply divisive US-
led intervention in 2003. As a consequence, for over a decade the EU made a clear
commitment to focus on the non-military dimensions of state-building in the
country, but the effectiveness of its efforts was hampered by a lack of clear leadership
by, and within, the EU. The apparent stabilisation of the situation in Iraq after 2008
also facilitated the continued focus of the EU on these longer-term structural policies,
including in collaboration with other international partners. Only recently has the
Union shifted to a more robust and intense engagement with Iraq in response to a
very clear and concrete threat—the rise of IS. As indicated in the 2012 PCA with
Iraq, a stronger focus on some elements of the human security approach, such as
human rights and the rule of law, can be expected as an EU contribution as part
of broader international and regional efforts to stabilise the country. In light of the
EU’s responses to the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq through the latter half
of 2014, combining both humanitarian efforts and a range of crisis management pol-
icies, the EU’s approach begins to resemble more closely its actions in Sahel. Speciﬁ-
cally, among others, the commitment to “the preparation of a comprehensive EU
regional strategy”113 in light of the threat posed by Islamic State underscores the
point that elements of the human security approach are pursued more consistently
in the presence of the EU’s own security interests.
EU Policies in Central Asia
Although the EU has been engaged with the ﬁve central Asian states since the early
1990s, their relations have signiﬁcantly intensiﬁed since the adoption of the EU’s
Central Asia Strategy in 2007. This strategy created a formal framework for
cooperation in several areas, including education, rule of law, human rights,
energy and transport, environment, trade and economic relations, as well
as security challenges such as border management and drug trafﬁcking.114
111. European Commission, "Cooperation between the European Union and Iraq. Joint Strategy Paper
2011–2013" (Brussels: European Commision, 2010).
112. European External Action Service, "EU–Iraq Relations", available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/iraq/
index_en.htm>.
113. Council of the European Union, "3361st Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council: Main Results"
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2014).
114. European Commission, "European Community Regional Strategy Paper", op. cit.
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Actions for security and stability
Soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the EU recognised the challenge the new
states faced after 1991 to build an entire border management infrastructure and train
the staff to service these borders. Considering also the fact that high levels of opium
and heroin easily pass from nearby Afghanistan and that effective border control is
an important security issue, the EU launched the Border Management in Central
Asia Programme (BOMCA), one of the biggest Commission assistance programmes
in the region,115 which has had a signiﬁcant impact on the overall constructive man-
agement of boundary disputes within the region.
Only a decade and a half later, the EU formally acknowledged in its Strategy for
Central Asia that human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation
increase the chances for long-term stability.116 Reﬂecting on the fact that the EU had
imposed sanctions in the past on Uzbekistan because of constant human rights vio-
lations, and given that human rights issues are systematically raised in political
meetings with Central Asian states, the EU has initiated dialogues on human
rights with all ﬁve Central Asian countries. These dialogues “constitute an essential
part of the EU’s overall strategy to promote respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, sustainable development, peace and stability” in the region.117
Similarly, the European Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia is one of the key
elements of the 2007 EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia.
The initiative, led by two EU member states, Germany and France, seeks a regional
approach which aims to tackle challenges common to all Central Asian
states, including shortcomings in the judicial system, problems in law enforcement,
and lack of accountability of national administrations.118 This initiative is
implemented by in-country programmes that set relevant national priorities.119
In comparison to these broader programmes, the Union’s security/stability
response to the conﬂict in Kyrgyzstan has been very limited: the Union endorsed
the decision of the government to establish the Kyrgyzstan Enquiry Commission
to investigate the inter-ethnic violence that occurred in the south of the country
in June 2010.120
Humanitarian actions
EU involvement in Central Asia began with the Technical Assistance to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, which aimed in
1991 to support the ﬁve newly independent states in their economic and social
115. European Commission, "EU Supports Well-Managed Borders in Central Asia", (Brussels: Euro-
pean Commission, 2002).
116. European Commission, "European Community Regional Strategy Paper", op. cit.
117. European Commission, "EUHuman Rights Dialogues in Central Asia", (Brussels: European Com-
mission, 2009).
118. European Commission, "EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia" (Brussels: European Commis-
sion, 2008).
119. European Union, "EU-Central Asia High Level Security Dialogue" (Brussels: European External
Action Service, 2013); European Commission, "EU Human Rights Dialogues in Central Asia", op. cit.;
"The European Union Supports Prevention of Torture Via Projects with the Tian Shan Policy Center
and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights" (Bishkek: Delegation of the European Union
to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2014).
120. Kyrgyzstan Enquiry Commission, "Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan" (Kyrgyzstan Enquiry Commission, 2010).
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development period. TACIS was replaced in 2007 by the Development Cooperation
Instrument (DCI), aimed at reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic
and social development. The DCI more broadly also focuses on the Millennium
Development Goals, i.e., health, education, social cohesion and employment, as
well as the promotion of democracy, good governance, and respect for human
rights and rule of law.121
In accordance with the Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, the
Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia (2007–2013) focused on
three main topics—rule of law (see above), education and environment.122
In the ﬁeld of education the EU–Central Asia Education Initiative has led to a sig-
niﬁcant increase in EU support for educational exchanges, education reforms and
professional training. In addition, under the Education Initiative various
cooperation programmes have taken place at the regional level, such as the
Tempus (modernisation in the higher education sector), the Erasmus Mundus Part-
nership (academic partnerships and student/scholar mobility) and the Central Asia
Research and Education Network–CAREN (ﬁnancing for high-speed information
and communication networks).
At the regional level, the Investment Facility for Central Asia (IFCA), launched in
2010, aims to promote additional investments and key infrastructure in the ﬁelds of
energy, environment and social infrastructure, while its extension to transport is
also on schedule.123 Funds from this programme have already been channelled in
Kazakhstan to support local banks to ﬁnance energy efﬁciency projects and
reduce energy losses and to Tajikistan for the improvement of water sanitary
systems. The EU contributes to theWorld Bank’s Central Asia Energy-Water Devel-
opment Program (CAEWDP) with the objective to strengthen cooperation and
coherence between the World Bank programme and EU initiatives on energy and
water.124 Noteworthy in this context is the EU–Central Asia Environment and
Water Initiative, which focuses onwater resource management, environmental pro-
tection measures, environmental governance and climate change125 and has con-
tributed to the so far peaceful management of the region’s potential water conﬂicts.
Apart from these regional initiatives, the EU has launched several programmes
addressing the needs of each individual state in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, the
Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP) was established to reinforce
the Uzbek civil society, by promoting partnership and cooperation between
Uzbek NGOs and their counterparts in the European Union. Various projects
have been completed under the IBPP focusing on social issues. This initiative has
proven to be a successful tool for a bottom-up approach “enhancing the partici-
pation of women, children and socially underprivileged as ﬁnal beneﬁciaries”.126
Moreover, the EU, together with the UN Children’s Fund and the Ministry of
121. European Parliament, "Työasiakirja on European Court of Auditors Special Report No 13/2013
(2013 Discharge): ’EU Development Assistance to Central Asia’", Talousarvion Valvontavaliokunta
(ed.) (European Parliament, 2014).
122. European Commission, "European Community Regional Strategy Paper", op. cit.
123. European Union, "European Union–Central Asia Development Cooperation", European Com-
mission (ed.) (Belgium: Publications Ofﬁce of the European Union, 2011).
124. European Commission, "EU to Join Efforts with the World Bank to Develop Water and Energy in
Central Asia" (Brussels: European Commission: Spokespersons’ Service, 2012).
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Health, has established a joint programme for the reduction of child mortality and
the improvement of maternal health, the “Improvement of Mother and Child Care
Services”.127
EU relations with Uzbekistan are regulated by the 1999 Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement, while the country receives ﬁnancial aid in the ﬁelds of
rural and local development, rule of law and judiciary reform, trade facilitation
and support to the private sector and small businesses.128 In 2011, the EU and
Uzbekistan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation
in the ﬁeld of energy. The main objectives of the MoU are the modernisation and
improvement of infrastructure for energy production and supply, more efﬁcient
regional and international cooperation on the national energy systems and the
development of cleaner energy and alternative resources.129
The EU supports Kyrgyzstan through several initiatives, such as the European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability
(IfS), Support to Non-State Actors (DCI-NSA), Investing in People (DCI-HUM),
Investing in the Environment (DCI-ENV), the Nuclear Safety Co-operation Instru-
ment (NSCI), the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP), and Migration Man-
agement and Irregular Migration (MIEUX). The actions of the EU focus on social
protection, educational reform and rule of law.130
Tajikistan and the EU have also signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment with the objective to enhance their cooperation, promote human rights and
facilitate Tajikistan’s economic transition and development and cooperation in all
key areas of reform.131 The EU has also launched ﬁve new projects under the
EIDHR programme, which target mainly the promotion and support of human
rights and democracy.132
Summary
Central Asia is by far the least conﬂict-affected area of the wider neighbourhood in
comparison to the Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. While there are
concerns about security and stability in the region, related to transnational
127. European External Action Service, "The Government of Uzbekistan, the EU and UNICEF Recom-
mit to Equitable Health Care for Mothers and Children", Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan, available: <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uzbekistan/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/
20120723_01_en.htm>.
128. European External Action Service, "EU Relations with Uzbekistan", available: <http://eeas.europa.
eu/uzbekistan/index_en.htm>.
129. The European Union and the Republic of Uzbekistan, "Memorandum of Understanding on
Cooperation in the Field of Energy between the European Union and the Republic of Uzbekistan" (Brus-
sels, 2011).
130. European External Action Service, "EU Relations with the Kyrgyz Republic", available: <http://
eeas.europa.eu/kyrgyz_republic/index_en.htm>.
131. "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a Partnership between the European Com-
munities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Tajikistan, of the Other Part",
Treaties Ofﬁce Database, available: <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWork
space/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=7341>.
132. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "European Union Supports Human Rights and
Democracy in Tajikistan", Asia-PLUS Daily Blitz, available: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=52f3349b5>.
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organised crime, spill-over effects fromAfghanistan, local and regional Islamist ter-
rorism and inter-ethnic tensions, as well as resource and boundary disputes within
and among Central Asian states, these pale in comparison to other areas examined
here. This is reﬂected in the EU’s approach to the region, which has adopted, at
regional and bilateral levels, a set of policies aimed at enhancing cooperation
with the region’s states by strengthening the capacity of their institutions and econ-
omies. While this includes a series of policies aimed at improving human rights and
the rule of law, signiﬁcantly more is invested in issues related to effective border
management and the development of the region’s energy resources—two
areas of core concern to the EU and its member states; concerns, moreover, that
have so far by and large remained unaffected by actual and latent conﬂicts in
the region. In other words, despite a signiﬁcant human security deﬁcit across
the Central Asian region, EU policies make far less use of the human security
approach.
Conclusion
Across the wider neighbourhood, the EU’s approach to managing conﬂict within
and between states clearly incorporates elements of a human security approach.
Through its various efforts, the Union has promoted respect for human rights
and the need to establish or strengthen legitimate political authority, and it has
done so through multilateral, bottom-up and regional efforts. Across the different
countries that constitute the neighbours’ neighbours, these dimensions are all
present in EU policies, albeit to varying degrees.
In this sense, human security is more than a rhetorical concept and is clearly
evident in the EU’s efforts to increase security and stability at a country and
regional level and to contribute to humanitarian relief and longer-term develop-
ment. While the EU remains focused on a set of core activities (rule of law/
good governance, institutional capacity building, humanitarian aid), programmes
and projects are adapted to speciﬁc countries’ particular needs within this frame-
work. This includes speciﬁc activities related to conﬂicts as and when they occur
or escalate, but the EU’s policies as such are not speciﬁcally “conﬂict-driven”.
Rather, responses to conﬂicts are embedded in existing regional and bilateral pol-
icies. It reﬂects what might be considered a comprehensive approach: the onset or
escalation of a conﬂict triggers not only an additional conﬂict-related policy
response (e.g., a military and/or civilian CSDP mission) but also a reassessment
of the whole package of existing policies. This is most obvious in relation to
the Sahel where this approach has also been facilitated by a common threat per-
ception and by clear leadership of, and within, the EU in response to the crisis in
Mali since 2012. Where either is absent, EU responses have often been less deci-
sive. This is the case in relation to Sudan and South Sudan and to some extent
Iraq (although there are indications of positive change in response to the
current IS crisis).
While undeniably part of the EU’s foreign and security policy in the wider neigh-
bourhood, the normative motivations that underpin the human security approach
are not a strategic driver of EU action. Where the EU has the most signiﬁcant
impact on human security—through humanitarian aid that relieves suffering in
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the short term—it has not achieved the sustainable change that would be necessary
to create an environment in which human security can be provided locally by states
and their governance arrangements.
As a consequence, the dependence on the EU as a human security provider
becomes entrenched. While local and regional security and stability are absolutely
essential in the broader context of human security, the volatility of the wider neigh-
bourhood to domestic, external and transnational threats in the context of generally
weak, low-capacity states requires a focus on traditional, hard security functions
and capabilities but creates few incentives for states to embrace the broader
human security agenda as long as EU humanitarian action tackles the most
immediate survival needs of populations under threat.
The fact that the EU has contributed to the perpetuation of this state of affairs
that effectively enables states across the wider neighbourhood to further their
own regime security needs (with signiﬁcant assistance from the EU) and leave
the achievement of essential human security needs to the EU is only in part a
function of the need to build institutional resilience among the neighbours’
neighbours. It also indicates that the EU approaches human security in an instru-
mental way in pursuit of its own security interests. The EU’s “ﬂexibility” of
adopting a human security approach is thus a function of the extent to which
its own interests are threatened. This becomes clear in the context of our com-
parative analysis: in the Sahel (and increasingly in Iraq/Syria) EU security inter-
ests are signiﬁcantly more at stake than in relation to the Sudans and Central
Asia, and it is in these latter two areas where the adoption of the human security
approach is least evident.
The instrumental use of elements of the human security approach clearly has
some positive consequences for people on the ground, but only in the short term.
In the long term, this approach is unlikely to lock in these temporary human secur-
ity gains and carries the risk of forever managing and containing recurrent security
threats in the wider neighbourhood rather than resolving them. This would clearly
run counter to the aspirations associated with an approach that considers human
security as an end in itself rather than merely a tool to achieve greater European
security.
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